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A slow process of deliberate management “innovation,”
in which each move is made only after it can be shown
that it will result in a savings, may be better than an ela
borate, expensive program of revision—

STEP-BY-STEP MANAGEMENT INNOVATION
by William H. Gruber
Research and Planning Institute, Inc.

controllers are the pri
mary source of information
used in the management
corporations. For some reason, per
haps because controllers have the
responsibility of producing balance
sheets and income statements, con
trollers frequently have a narrow
view of information. Management
information is frequently very dif
ferent from the accounting reports
produced by the corporate control
lers; thus, line executives are fre
quently dissatisfied with these ac
counting reports.
Surveys by the National Indus
trial Conference Board and the Fi
ften

O
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nancial Executives Institute1 indi
cate that many corporations have
ofcreated management information
systems (MIS) functions which are
independent of the controller in
the organization structure. The
ability of a new MIS function to
increase the management compe
tence in one firm is described in
1 See Stieglitz, M., and C. D. Wilkerson,
Corporate Organization Structure, Stud
ies in Personnel Policy, No. 10, New
York, National Industrial Conference
Board, 1968; and Kennedy, D. W.,
“What a President Needs to Know about
MIS,” Financial Executive, December,
1970, pp. 55-57ff.

this article. This company’s ex
perience illustrates the exciting
potential for increasing corpor
ate effectiveness through better
use of management information
systems. The challenge for manage
ment in the 1970’s will be to un
lock the potential for increased
efficiency that can be achieved
through the kind of innovations
described in this case study.
In a large chemical company
headquartered in New York, the
appointment of a new president
(who had been vice president of
R&D) was followed by rapid im
provement in the management
21

Experienced line management was willing to work closely with the director of MIS because
he had been a competent chemist, and understood many problems because of this expe
rience, and also because he was willing to give enough time for necessary "interfaces."

capability. Sales forecasts were de
veloped and used to schedule pro
duction and to motivate the sales
force. Marketing costs were related
to sales in order to test for the
usefulness of alternative sources of
sales growth. A computer-based
corporate long-range planning sys
tem was initiated in order to pro
vide a basis for the development
of corporate strategies. Communi
cation patterns were monitored,
and problem-solving groups were
created to bring together managers
from different functional areas who
could contribute to the solution of
problems that crossed functional
areas.
This company continued to grow
rapidly and profitably, even during
the 1970 recession. The sharp in
crease in management competence
achieved from 1968 to 1971 left the
company in a very favorable posi
tion relative to its competition.
Managers at several levels in the
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hierarchy of the firm were aware
of the significant management im
provements that had been achieved
in a short period of time. Company
executives believed that they were
winners and displayed a willing
ness to innovate and to work
harder.
All of this was accomplished in
an orderly way. This was not a
crisis drive to cut costs. Very few
people were fired. Significant im
provement in the management
capability of this firm occurred be
cause the new president was com
mitted to the process of “manage
ment innovation.” He began to al
locate resources to improve the
process of management in a way
very similar to that in which new
products and processes are devel
oped in R&D. He had inherited a
traditional corporate management
that was spending almost all of its
time on maintenance activities. As
the former vice president of R&D,
he was aware that new products
are not invented unless someone is
given the responsibility for invent
ing them. Accordingly, he set up a
management innovation group to
improve the management capa
bility.
The following case study is an
evaluation of the management in
novations achieved by this new
company president.
A case study

There have been case studies of
how new products are developed

in R&D. Some case studies of major
management decisions, such as the
GE move to decentralization, are
available. Progress in developing
a new management competence,
however, has rarely been reported
in the literature. How does a firm
begin to use a computer-based
long-range planning model? What
is so difficult about a sales fore
casting model that a large firm
with a strong computer capability
should not begin to use one until
1970, rather than five years earlier?
The objectives of this case study
are:

1. Examine conditions favorable
to innovation in management;
2. Report on technical capabili
ties needed for such innovations;
3. Provide an analysis of difficul
ties and risks involved; and,
4. Provide a basis for estimating
costs/benefits and required time to
achieve important progress in man
agement capabilities and perform
ance.

The new president had no con
crete understanding of what could
be achieved when he initiated the
effort to improve the management
capability of his corporation. Al
though he had very little formal
management education, he had
been an experienced research
chemist and had achieved an ef
fective research division during his
tenure as vice president of re
search. He was very young com
pared to the company presidents
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of the major firms in this industry.
In one of his first administrative
decisions, this young president in
itiated a new capability. He cre
ated a management information sys
tem (MIS) function and appointed
as its director a Ph.D. chemist who
had been his administrative officer
in the research division. Both the
new company president and the di
rector of MIS had had relatively
little experience in marketing, pro
duction, and finance. They did not
have a formal educational back
ground in these fields equal to
what might be expected from a
young M.S. or M.B.A.from a gradu
ate school of business. In one re
spect, however, this lack of aca
demic preparation was an asset;
experience-based line management
was willing to work with the direc
tor of MIS because he had been a
competent chemist and understood
many problems as a result of this
experience.
That the director of MIS and the
new company president were able
and experienced managers was
clearly helpful in the effort to im
prove the management competence
of their firm. They had very few
theoretical insights about what had
to be done, and much of their pro
gress was a result of problem-solv
ing behavior quite in harmony with
what might be expected of research
chemists. They did not accept man
agement practice as they found it,
nor did they have a preconceived
vision of what could be accom
plished. But if answers were to be
come available to the logical and
proper questions they asked, then a
stronger management information
capability would inevitably be re
quired.
Strategy

Many decisions were made in im
plementing this management inno
vation effort. The management im
provement projects had a common
set of characteristics that provided
a strategy for management innova
tion. These common characteristics
for management innovation pro
jects were:
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1. Low risks: All the initial man
agement improvement projects
were specified in such a way that
there was a high probability of
success. No project that involved a
large expenditure of funds was in
itiated. All projects that involved
computers were well within the
technical frontier. Computer pro
graming was done on service
bureau terminals in order not to
disrupt the operations of the cor
porate computer facility.
2. Low technical complexity:
The models of market activity used
to forecast sales, plan production,
and motivate the sales force were
relatively simple. The director of
MIS had access to very sophisti
cated university consultants, and he
was
aware of several large
and complex management science
models that were being tried in his
industry. Such models at the fron
tier of management science were
rejected by this director of MIS,
who correctly perceived that a
traditionally managed company
could not cope with sophisticated
models even if such techniques
could be developed at a reasonable
cost.
3. Tight funding: This MIS
function started with a director and
one staff professional. By the end
of the first year there were three
staff professionals, and this in
creased to nine by the end of the
second year and 15 by the end of
the third year. Staff were added
to this MIS capability only when
a line executive who would be
served with a new MIS reporting
capability agreed to reduce his
staff.2 Thus, the increase in the MIS
staff did not cause an expansion in
the total support staff of this firm.
4. Fast payback: Each manage
ment innovation project was evalu
ated for its contribution to reduc
tions in direct costs. Credit was
not given for intangible benefits.
There had to be reductions in em
ployees, inventory levels, or some
other tangible resource on which
a cost could be estimated. It was
calculated, in an analysis of com-

The director of MIS and the

new company president had
very few theoretical insights
about what had to be done,
and much of their progress

was a result of problem

solving behavior quite in
harmony with what might

be expected of research
chemists, They did not accept
management practice as they

found it, nor did they have a
preconceived vision of what
could be accomplished, But if

answers were to become
available to the logical and
proper questions they asked,
then a stronger management

information capability would
inevitably be required,

2 Or a member of the professional staff
of the controller could be eliminated.
23

Line executives were encouraged to work directly with the computer-based MIS;
software was developed to permit executives to achieve useful outputs while
spending relatively little time in learning how to ask the computer questions.

pleted management innovation pro
jects, that cost reductions from
each project paid for the innova
tion costs within eight months after
the costs had been incurred.
5. Acceptance by line execu
tives: Projects were not initiated
unless the line executives involved
were willing to use the expected
results of a management innova
tion effort.
This was not a crash program of
management improvement. The
management innovation operations
were increased in scope in a way
similar to that in which a good
R&D effort for new products and
processes is expanded. The profes
sional staff was carefully selected
and was hired slowly. Although
there were a very large number
of possible management improve
ment projects visible at the time
the new company president took
charge, systems analysts were as
signed to projects with great care
in order to prevent the problems
often created when there are too
many balls up in the air at the
24

same time. It should be recalled
that this was a profitable, rapidly
growing company, and top man
agement was of the opinion that it
would be incorrect to risk upsetting
the corporate management by
abrupt or high-pressure efforts to
achieve very rapid progress in the
development of an improved man
agement capability.
Major accomplishments

Although there were a large
number of management innovations
during the first three years of this
effort, only eight will be described.
These examples were selected to il
lustrate the breadth of management
activity that was improved.
1. Computer-based corporate plan
ning capability provided a basis for
evaluating future activity (e.g.,
sales by product line) under vari
ous assumptions. This capability
made planning easier, and it in
creased the commitment to plan
ning of a large number of the cor
porate executives. In addition, the

budgeting for the next year was
made more efficient because this
new computer capability produced
alternative budgets quickly with
relatively little clerical effort. One
result of this increase in the utiliza
tion of information for planning
was the questioning of previously
accepted expense/sales ratios. This
computer-based planning capability
facilitated analyses of the effect on
corporate sales and profits of
changes in discretionary expenses
such as advertising and sales force
levels.
2. Monthly sales forecasts by
product line adjusted longer-run
trends by seasonal and cyclical fac
tors. These forecasts were used for
sales quotas, marketing strategies,
and production scheduling. Re
sponsibility for profit center man
agement by product line became a
reality when sales performance was
evaluated against expectations cal
culated with trend, seasonal, and
cyclical effects identified.
The old easy excuses to explain
poor performance, such as, “July is
always a bad month,” were tested
against historical experience as cal
culated by the computer sales fore
casting system.
3. Product cost control system
identified expenses which could be
controlled at the product line level.
Allocated costs to product lines
which could not be controlled by
product line were separated from
the controllable costs, thereby in
creasing the visibility of the pro
duct line performance effect on
corporate profitability.
4. Marketing customer control
system identified and maintained a
record of activity for each cus
tomer. Salesmen were given in
structions for each customer, and
better communication to and from
salesmen was achieved. Systems an
alysis of the marketing information
used prior to this new capability
discovered that salesmen were re
porting customer activity which
was incorrect. A huge marketing
information system had been in
use which did not have an inter
active capability. Salesmen had
been flooded with useless informa
Management Adviser

tion. Sales reports were completed
but never used. This large mass
of information which had been
passing back and forth between
marketing management and the
sales force was terminated, and the
new system which created a dia
logue between the marketing data
base and the sales force substituted
in its place. Thus a little-used static
system was replaced by a dynamic
information system which created
a capability to absorb new informa
tion and enriched the customer
data base as a result of the experi
ence reported by the sales force.
5. Programing software capabil
ity allowed managers who were
inexperienced with computers to
ask questions of the system. The in
volvement of Une management
with the new computer-based man
agement information system was an
objective given high priority by the
director of management informa
tion systems. His staff were in
structed to encourage line execu
tives to work directly with the
computer-based MIS that had been
developed. Software was developed
permitting executives who were in
experienced in the use of compu
ters to achieve useful MIS out
puts with a relatively small invest
ment in time allocated to learn how
to ask questions of the computer
system. Terminals were located
close to the offices of the line ex
ecutives.
6. Share of market budgeting
system provided a more realistic
set of objectives for product line
managers. It had been the practice
to calculate a year’s budget in No
vember and December of the pre
vious year. Seasonal and cyclical
factors soon made this budget ir
relevant, and yet each month vari
ances from this static budget were
calculated and “explained.” Under
the new system, product line man
agers were held responsible for a
share of market, and actual per
formance was compared with a
sales budget calculated each month
from estimates of total market ac
tivity by product line.
7. Variance budgeting systems
predicted year-end variance based
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It had been the practice to calculate a year's budget in Novem
ber and December; under the new system actual performance
was compared with a sales budget calculated each month.

on year-to-date results compared
with budget. Total market volume
estimates were calculated for the
year on a monthly basis. Thus all
levels of management received a
report of the potential by product
on an estimated basis. The actual
year-to-date performance was com
pared with estimated yearly per
formance on a monthly basis in or
der to give management an ap
proximation of what had to be
achieved in order to fulfill the con
tribution of each product line to
budgeted corporate performance.
8. On-line production and inven
tory planning system replaced a
slow and labor-intensive system.
This gave more detailed informa
tion by kind of item within a pro
duct line and provided an estimate
of production costs under various
volumes and product mixes (e.g.,
forecasted cost of goods sold).

All of the progress described
here involved management innova
tions in the utilization of informa
tion. Is that all there is to progress
in a management capability? Obvi

ously not! Information must be
processed by line management into
decisions, into actions. There were
many related organizational
changes but it seems that the de
velopment of an MIS capability
does appear to be the leading edge
in the management innovation ef
fort of many companies.
Involvement of line management
This brief overview of the ma
jor systems innovations which had
been implemented in just a few
years indicates what can be accom
plished with a small MIS staff that
understands the information needs
of management. The information
required as data inputs to the new
systems was readily available. The
computer programing was not dif
ficult. These new MIS capabilities
were developed quickly because of
the quality of the MIS-line man
agement relationships and the high
quality of the MIS director and his
staff.
The budgets of the line execu
tives were charged for the ex
25

penses incurred during a manage
ment innovation effort related to a
given line manager’s activities.
When a manager funds a systems
project, he has a feeling of con
trol. He is more involved in what
results from the project, and he de
serves significant credit if the pro
ject succeeds because he is the one
who took risks with his own funds.
The practice of having a user pay
for the systems that are developed
has still a further advantage: it in
creases the probability of relevance
of the work done by the MIS staff.
Involvement of line management
with the development of the MIS
capability was critical in the pro
gress that was achieved. To achieve
this involvement required several
years of learning experience. The
support by the company president,
of course, was an additional moti
vating force. However, a new com
pany president can dictate only to
a limited degree if he inherits a
strong management. The utilization
of new management techniques is
a difficult kind of problem to man
age by fiat. It seems fair to say
that the involvement of line man
agement in the application of the
new MIS capability resulted from
the performance of the MIS staff
in producing several very useful
new systems.
A second factor leading to the
involvement of the line managers
was the educational effort of the
director of MIS. An MIS manager
with long experience in the tech
nology of his industry is a very rare
combination. His talents for in
struction and persuasion, previously
exercised in the administration of
R&D, were put to good use in his
new position. This director of MIS
had the happy faculty of being a
good listener. He knew that he
could not force line executives to
accept new techniques in manage
ment. Recognizing the limitations
of his power, he allocated a large
proportion of his time to the inter
face between the MIS function and
the line executives. This selling of
MIS and the related educational
effort were very low pressure ac
tivities. The line managers — who
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had to cooperate, get involved, pick
up a suggestion—were primarily
competent, experienced executives.
The suggestions of the director of
MIS were very new to the back
ground of these men. Thus, this
very gradual evolution toward in
creasing the ability of these line
executives to work with new in
formation concepts appears to have
been exactly what was required.
Two men responsible

That only two men—the com
pany president and the director of
MIS—created this rapid increase in
management capability should be
emphasized. The progress de
scribed required less than three
years to achieve. The number of
executives and professional staff
personnel involved in the manage
ment innovation has been increas
ing each year. Credit is given, how
ever, to the company president and
his director of MIS. The manage
ment innovations achieved in this
chemical company are the result
of their skill and commitment, just
as the success of ITT belongs to
one man, Harold S. Geneen. The
cooperation and dedication of
many executives and staff members
were necessary. However, the com
pany president and director of MIS
secured this involvement.
An image exists of the dynamic
leader who accepts large risks in
order to achieve huge rewards. The
emphasis in this case report on the
role of the company president and
director of MIS as guiding forces
in the process of change provides
some cause to question the stereo
type of dynamic leaders as great
risk-takers. Although this is a firm
that invests over $30 million a year
in high-risk R&D for new products
and processes, the growth in the
MIS capability and the significant
management innovations that re
sulted were accomplished at a very
low risk. There were no big invest
ments in complicated models. Com
puter equipment investments were
very modest.
The management of this firm
might be criticized for such a low-

risk posture for its investment in
management innovation. One might
wonder about this unwillingness to
take risks for improved manage
ment capabilities, given the invest
ment of millions of dollars in highrisk research for new products and
even larger amounts allocated to
scale up inventions in attempts to
penetrate new markets.
This relative unwillingness to
risk for new management innova
tion may be explained by the fact
that failure to achieve a manage
ment innovation would have re
flected more directly on the reputa
tion of management than would
failure of an investment in R&D
for new products or processes. Fail
ures are expected in the research
laboratory; they are more difficult
to explain when they occur within
corporate headquarters.
A second reason for the cautious
introduction of this management
innovation effort is that it was im
portant to win the confidence and
cooperation of line executives; this
required time, experience, and ed
ucation. One of the most serious
criticisms of the McNamara effort
to bring systems analysis into the
Pentagon was that he did not give
enough attention to the interface
problem between the staff profes
sionals responsible for systems an
alysis and the high-ranking military
officers. The McNamara experience,
as well as reports from a large
number of other efforts to intro
duce new. management techniques,3
suggests that the cautious strategy
used in this chemical company was
a major reason for the success of
the management innovation effort.
This strategy which appears so
sensible in hindsight may have
been caused, in part, by circum
stances unique to the personnel in
volved. The director of MIS was
3 For an overview of this management
science utilization problem, see refer
ence 4. One finding presented by
Gruber and Niles is that the presidents of
the Institute of Management Science and
the Operations Research Society of Am
erica used the utilization problem as a
major theme of three out of six recent
presidential addresses in the 1960’s. See
references 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, and 9.
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the only management scientist
(and this was primarily a capability
gained from on-the-job experi
ences) in the group. All other
new hires for the professional
staff had little experience in the
development of management infor
mation systems. Each new project
required a large amount of the
director’s time. He had to deal with
the line management to obtain co
operation. He had to educate his
staff about how the systems effort
to be programed would be used.
He was given many special pro
jects by the company president.
He was involved with the problems
of recruiting for his rapidly ex
panding staff of information spec
ialists. The director of MIS was a
bottleneck through which all MIS
inputs, outputs, and decisions had
to pass. Here is a company that
gave less attention to the initiation
of an R&D project with an ex
pected cost of hundreds of thous
ands of dollars than to an MIS pro
ject that might involve an invest
ment of less than $20,000.
Executives in this company rec
ognized the bottleneck problem
and the low-risk posture for the
MIS effort that may have been ex
cessively cautious. The director of
MIS has developed a stronger man
agement team and now has a back
log of projects that will involve
changes in the way over $100 mil
lion are spent each year. There is
reason to believe that further sig
nificant increases in efficiency will
be possible as a result of these pro
posed MIS projects.
The management innovation cap
ability in this firm has matured
from fledgling operation with a di
rector and one assistant to a staff
of 16 professionals. New problems
are to be expected in this new
stage of the management innova
tion effort. Greater risks have been
accepted. A significant increase in
the computer facility has been
budgeted. Problems which had
been resistant to corrective action
are now under analysis. The lowrisk nature of the management in
novation effort reported in this case
study represents a stage in the life
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cycle of the innovation effort. It is
not yet possible to report on the
progress that will be achieved dur
ing the more mature stage of the
management innovation effort into
which the activities of this cor
poration have evolved. The experi
ence and the progress achieved
during the early stages of the man
agement innovation effort increase
the probability of success for the
more difficult projects which have
recently been initiated. Good work
ing relationships with line manage
ment have been established. The
professional staff has been trained
on the easier projects. The director
of MIS is aware of the capabilities
of each professional staff member.
The cautious strategy for the de
velopment of a management inno
vation capability has facilitated the
transition from easy to more diffi
cult problems which must now be
overcome.

Conclusion

Most large United States corpor
ations are now experimenting with
efforts to improve the quality of
management. Little is known about
the process by which management
competence is increased. It may be
that a slow and cautious strategy
for implementing the MIS capabil
ity will prove more effective than a
crash program. Unlike crisis actions
to meet competition with a product
improvement, innovations in man
agement require a new way of
thinking.
The acceptance of responsibility
for increasing corporate efficiency
through management innovations
requires the involvement of top
management. Resources must be al
located for management innova
tion just as investments are made
for the R&D that produces new
products. Few corporations have
achieved results equal to what has
been reported in this case study.
Our experience with the manage
ment capabilities of several hun
dred firms indicates that the senior
executives of most companies are
not sufficiently committed to the
process of management innovation.

Crisis management appears to
dominate. Senior executives of com
panies are so busy fighting fires
that they have little time to do
the work required to achieve the
management innovations which
would reduce the frequency of
fires. The experience of manage
ment innovation in this chemical
company indicates that this fire
fighting syndrome need not pre
vent progress in management inno
vation. It may be expected that the
failure of most corporate executives
to be involved with management
innovations will be cured after a
few corporations have achieved
similar increases in management
competence. Corporations which
accept competition through pro
duct innovation will soon be com
peting through management inno
vations. This case study provides
an example of what can be
achieved by corporate executives
who elect to accept the challenge
of management innovation.
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